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The Don't Rules in Societal Trauma and Its Healing

The Nightmare Must End

Toward a New Palestinian Strategy

Is the 'War on Terrorism' Repeating Major Errors of the 'Cold War'?

Is the War On Terrorism

Repeating Serious Mistakes of the Cold War?

Stephen M. Sachs, IUPUI

In focussing heavily upon countering the attacks of 9/11 and related acts of violence with a "war on terrorism", rather than as a campaign against serious crimes against humanity, the Bush Administration is in danger of so militarizing many areas of U.S. policy as to repeat serious errors of the cold war. Clearly, preventing terror requires some military expenditure, preparedness and action. The problem arises when the emphasis on military approaches is unbalanced or inappropriate. President Bush's instincts seem to be in the direction of a too heavily military approach, but his administration has listened to some voices calling for a more balanced course. These viewpoints need to be more amplified in White House policy discussions.

Since the allocation of money, and the requirements and restrictions upon its use, are often the truest indication of actual policy, examination of budget requests and projections is a good place to begin an analysis of what is happening to U.S. Policy. The Bush administration has asked Congress for a $46 billion (13%)1 increase in the military budget to just under $400 billion (excluding military retirement and health care benefits for current personnel, and not including domestic anti-terrorism security and preparedness). This includes $7.8 billion on developing an as yet unproven anti ballistic missile defense, when the main threats to the U.S. for the foreseeable future are of of a different nature, and $8 billion on nuclear weapons development, that seems inappropriate for current security need. Also, development of a number of expensive weapons systems is going ahead at a rapid pace, when some of them, such as new fighter aircraft, could be developed more slowly - for less money each year - as current U.S. fighters are projected to continue to be the best in the world for a considerable period. It needs to be noticed that the next highest military budgets, including those of some of our close allies, and none of those the U.S. sees as terrorism supporting states, are far smaller: Russia, $60 billion; China, $42 billion; Japan, $40 billion: United Kingdom 34 billion; and Saudi Arabia, $27 billion. Much less emphasis has been placed on improving the economy (counting Bush's resquest for an economic stimulus package that failed to pass congress because of debate over the appropriateness of the specific spending proposals), including giving opportunity to those most in need, when a sound and reasonably equitable economy is the foundation for national security, which is weakened by inappropriate military spending.

Moreover, the White House budget called for more spending on each of the missile shield and nuclear weapons development programs than was initially requested for international development and humanitarian assistance ($7.6 billion). Fortunately, the President has since recognized the relationship between international poverty, poor nation instability, and terrorism, and has announced the intention to increase U.S. foreign aid by $5 billion over two years (though there is debate about the appropriateness of the requirements the administration would make for receiving the aid). This figure could be increased significantly by cutting some aspects of the military budget to more appropriate levels, even while increasing domestic economic development and reducing the deficit.

In addition, there is the issue of military assistance, which rose in the President's budget to $3.8 billion, and is likely to rise further as the administration expands U.S. international military commitments. Undoubtedly, some military assistance can be appropriate for building peace and reducing violence, including "terrorism." However, it is important to note the myriad of recent and current problems that the U.S. is now facing because of military assistance given during the Cold War, so that the same mistakes are not repeated in the war on terrorism. For example, in Somalia, military assistance during the Cold War greatly increased the prestige and power of military commanders, undermining civil leaders in a fragile post-colonial regime.2 This led first to a military coup. Then, when the central government collapsed, the result was the rise of warlords whose power struggles brought about the humanitarian crises in which the U.S. intervened, at quite some cost. Indeed, the turmoil ultimately resulting from U.S. military aid has long left that still not yet reconstituted nation a haven for Al Qida, and other such groups; and intelligence indicates that it was al Qida that instigated the terrible incident in Mogadiscio that propelled the U.S. to withdraw from Somalia. Similarly, the long civil war in Angola was fueled, and likely considerably extended, because the U.S. aided UNITA, as an "anticommunist" army, against a regime the U.S. perceived to be too far to the left. Now there, and elsewhere in Africa, instability and conflict are major problems that the U.S. is trying to help overcome.

Of course, military aid alone, has not been the entire problem in U.S. foreign policy failures, or initial successes with long term negative consequences. In Iran, the Shah would not have arisen in the first place without the CIA and British M16 working in nonmilitary ways (mostly financially) to overthrow the flourishing democracy in Iran of Mohammed Mossadeq (See"Mid-East Commentary By Ahmed Bouzid). It did not help U.S. relations with the regime that replaced the Shah, that among other supports, the U.S. provided him with military and intelligence assistance, including training in how to torture people.

Most relevantly, the Taliban would not have come to power in Afghanistan and collaborated with Al Qida, giving them a significant operating base, if it had not been for the U.S. arming some of the more extreme groups (among others) in the guerilla war to oust the Russians, and the U.S. and its allies doing nothing significant to help recreate some stability when the war was over. The Bush administration has at least learned that much, and despite its early abhorrence to "nation building" as a viable policy, the U.S. is now working with international partners to do just that, once the current military operation is completed.

One wonders, however, if the Bush administration has as yet learned all that it needs to, given all the military assistance it is giving to many unstable nations in the Caucuses and elsewhere. Unless great care is taken, that assistance may eventually cause a great deal of trouble for the people of at least some of those countries, and ultimately for the U.S.

A particularly important concern is with Columbia. It is certainly a desirable goal to strengthen that nation's weak democracy, and an ending of the Columbian drug trade would also be a good thing. There is no question that it is a serious problem that the civilian government of Columbia cannot control much of the country. But has the drug war in Columbia to date been a wise means for attaining any of these goals?2 And more important, now that peace talks have broken down in Columbia and the war and related violence are increasing in intensity, would it be wise to follow the administrations's proposal to increase military aid to Columbia, while removing restrictions that such aid only be used in the anti-drug campaign (which has never been possible to insure, but has been some restraint) and that human rights compliance be dropped as a requirement for continuing to receive the funding? The whole history of the U.S. military relationship with Latin America along with the details of the current situation in Columbia are evidence that this proposal of the Bush administration is ill advised. It should be remembered that some of the worst military dictators in Latin America have been graduates of the U.S. Army's School of the Americas, providing training to Latin American military personnel. Good relations between the U.S. military and the Chilean Military (plus the fact that the White House was not happy with the socialist philosophy of the Chilean President) encouraged the harsh Military Coup and long ruling hunta that over threw the democratically elected Alliende government.

A portion of the problem that the Columbian government faces is that it does not have adequate control over its military, which allows at least some of its members to collaborate with right wing death squads, that it should be repressing. The unrestrained actions of the death squads have been one of the barriers to reaching a peaceful settlement with the insurgents. Increased aid to the Columbian military while removing the controls on that aid will only weaken civilian control and exacerbate the situation that has made settlement difficult. The increase in power of the military that will result is likely to undermine democracy, bring a repressive right wing government, politically less willing and able to work out a settlement, and deepen the war, as occurred with U.S. military aid to El Salvador. If the U.S. government does not have any alternatives to increased and less controlled military aid, then it should ask the citizens of Columbia what to do. Columbian civil society groups are offering numerous suggestions, including strengthening the judiciary as part of a larger plan. They know the situation better than people in Washington and are most effected by what ever is done on their behalf. Their ideas need to be heard, if the U.S. really wants to promote peace, stability and democracy.

Over all, there is a problem of looking at the issues of terror and violence too strictly from a military perspective. The Bush administration has begun to see that. I encourage them to go much further. The acts of September 11 and other atrocities against civilians are criminal acts, and should be considered as such. The advent of community policing has demonstrated that crime can be better reduced when a team approach is taken in which the armed force, in this case the police, is one of a number of collaborators in a joint problem solving effort, in which the police role is transformed, in part, as well as reduced, as it is integrated into an effective holistic preventive, as well as reactive, program. The same needs to be done with dealing with international terror. The military has its proper policing role, but the crimes should be treated as such and tried in civilian courts, domestic and international, in a permanent collaborative international effort, rather than through temporary alliances led by one country. That approach needs to deal with the full range of problems involved, in a well thought out and comprehensive way.
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1. U.S. Military and international development and assistance budget figures for this artricle came from "Military Spending Goes Through the Roof," FCNL Washington Newsletter, February, 2002, p. 6.

2. See, Stephen Sachs," Los Angeles and Somalia: Community Service Policing and Community Empowerment," in the Winter Spring 1994 Issue of Nonviolent Change.

3. For an analysis showing that they have not been appropriate, see Stephen Sachs, "Promise, Frustration and Danger: The Complexities of Reaching Peace in Columbia," in the Spring 1999 issue of Nonviolent Change.

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©2002. All rights reserve. The Nonviolent Change Journal is published by the Research/Study Team on Nonviolent Large Systems Change - an interorganizational and international project of The Organization Development Institute.

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