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Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? The Impact of Trauma and Injustice

Lessons From John Bull's Troubled Island

Rebuilding A Damaged Palestine

Not All Is Lost

Sri Lanka Stops War To Talk Peace

LESSONS FROM JOHN BULL'S TROUBLED ISLAND

by Sharon Sadeh

An unusual debate took place last month in the British House of Commons. Politicians discussed whether there is a similarity between the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, and if so, whether it would is possible to apply the lessons of one to the other. David Trimble, the Protestant Unionist leader and First Minister of the Northern Ireland executive, contended that the two conflicts were not analogous. "On the Middle East I am a little concerned about some of the parallels that are drawn with Northern Ireland," he said. "Between 1970 and1995 we had many different political initiatives, none of which succeeded. The process [in Northern Ireland] after 1995 was more successful [because] the terrorists became convinced that their campaign would fail and there was a change in the underlying ideology. Even Irish Republicans realized the blood and soil nationalism that they had been attached to was wrong. I do not see any sign of a similar ideological change in the Middle East."

Prime Minister Tony Blair said in response that Trimble was mistaken. "I believe there is a parallel. I do not believe that it would ever have been possible to have a process unless there was continuous engagement in a detailed proposal to work our way out of the impasse, and a political vision to go alongside that."

Blair is right, says Michael Ancram, deputy leader of the Conservative Party and shadow foreign secretary. Ancram served in the Northern Ireland Office between 1993 and 1997, first as a permanent undersecretary and then as minister. He was involved alongside the prime minister at the time, John Major, in the contacts that paved the way for the first cease-fire with the IRA in August 1994 and the formulation of the joint Declaration of Intentions for the governments of Britain and Ireland, which was the basis for the peace accord signed in April 1998.

Ancram said: "Conflict resolution has certain common strands, and I was involved in resolving a conflict by using mechanisms which I think do have a relevance to the Middle East as well." His visit here [London] in February, during which he met Yasser Arafat and leading Israeli politicians, including Benjamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres, reinforced this belief, he says. Ancram told Ha'aretz that he remembers well his initial days at the Northern Ireland Office: "When I arrived in Northern Ireland in 1993, all talks had broken down. Nobody was talking to anybody. The two governments were not talking to each other, the parties were not talking to us, they were not talking to each other. And very slowly we began to have a process of dialogue again."

Representatives of both sides met secretly at first to discuss issues like security and economics - from this point, the process began to move forward. "The two governments put together frameworks which were not blueprints, but road maps. Showing that there was a way through, and then saying to the parties you cannot say there's no answer, because we show there are answers."

The question is, he said, whether one is prepared to work toward such answers, or to find another way through. "And that was the dynamism that pushed that process forward."

At the same time, a global effort was undertaken to raise funds for developing Northern Ireland, which until the 1990s, was one of the weakest areas in the United Kingdom. "The moment the first cease-fire took place, in August 1994, the investment began ... we had conferences on the Northern Ireland economy, where business people came and said `if there's peace, we'll invest.' And all of that was part of saying to all the parties involved in the conflict that at the economic and political level, there are benefits by ceasing violence and moving forward on a democratic basis of dialog. They are all tied together these things - low level talks, economic benefits, confidence building ... In Northern Ireland, we called it the peace dividend. People can physically feel that life is better, because there is peace. The process began to create a dividend in the communities to the extent that they started to say the terrorist organizations are no longer defending us, they are no longer working for us, they are actually harming us, hindering us; and suddenly these organizations became isolated."

The successful formula was worked out at the end of marathon negotiations at the Stormont Castle, just before Easter 1998. The accord stipulated that a joint government of Protestant Unionists (pro British) and Catholic Republicans (Irish nationalists) could be established, as well as mechanisms for deepening the social and economic integration of the two parts of Ireland.

One of the major stumbling blocks was the mutual enmity between the two sides. "One of the problems was that the Northern Protestant population was frightened of being dominated by the Catholic majority in all Ireland. Ian Paisley [the leader of extreme Protestants opposed to the Northern Ireland peace process] was talking about domination by the Pope and the Catholic Church. The Catholic population was frightened by the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. So there were fears both ways, and in Northern Ireland I was always told that they were based on theological grounds."

The challenge, Ancram says, was to show people that fear was not necessarily justifiable in the long term. "When the two governments produced their framework document, at first everybody threw their hands in the air. The Unionists of the time said this is a sell-out; the Nationalists said this is a betrayal of the concept of one Ireland; and we just said this is not a blueprint, it is just showing you that if you talk you might find a way through. In the end, the Good Friday agreement is not far away from the framework document."

Ancram says he detected the same suspicious mood during his visit to Israel and the territories earlier this year. "I was talking to people in the Middle East and got the same sense of mutual fear as was in Northern Ireland." This fear can only be overcome through a slow process of confidence-building, he says. Direct, bilateral agreements are needed rather than international conferences. These agreements must offer security on one hand - "so you don't find yourself being blown up in a restaurant in Tel Aviv" - and a removal of the political and economic suffocation of the Palestinians on the other hand.

He feels that if there is a ray of hope in the current situation, it derives from the fact that "there is a much greater sense that there is now a road map, that both the Camp David and Taba negotiations showed that there was a way through, that it is not an impossible problem, and I think that can create the basis for confidence building.

"What was a hindrance for progress in talks in Northern Ireland before we had our framework done, was that people said `this is a waste of time, there's no way through.' And we heard that from a lot of people, why should we bother to stop? There is no way through, we'll never resolve this. And the framework document the two governments produced said: `Yes, there is.'"

The conflict in Northern Ireland continued for over 26 years and was engendered by feelings of deprivation by the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. This community comprises 42 percent of the population in this area, which numbers 1.6 million people. The Catholic residents felt that the British establishment intentionally discriminated against them. The protest movement led by civil rights activists in 1968-1969 against discriminatory policies toward the Catholics in the areas of housing and social benefits, and against the cruel treatment by the security forces, did not produce results. The IRA began a violent campaign that spread into Britain, aided by financial contributions from Irish living in the United States, weapons shipments from Libya, and training conducted jointly with other terror organizations, including the PLO.

The actions of the Irish underground invited retaliatory actions on the part of the Protestant underground organizations. Thus, the British army and security forces found themselves engaged in two battles at the same time. The military confrontation, which lasted from January 1971 through July 1997, claimed the lives of about 3,600 people in Northern Ireland and the British isles. During these years, the British employed a variety of military tactics, starting with internment without trial, and escalating to military raids on the bases of "Irish terrorists" and "targeted killings" of IRA men. The elite SAS unit was the main "executioner" in these operations.

These are the same tactics being used by Israel in the current conflict with the Palestinians, and yet Israel was strongly condemned by Britain because of that. Isn't this an example of a double standard or hypocrisy?

"No, because Britain changed its policy when it realized that the conflict in Northern Ireland has no military solution. I came to Northern Ireland toward the end of the major military campaign. You could have military answers to immediate problems, but in the end you cannot resolve them only by military action, but through the political process. That realization on both sides was key for making progress."

In the Middle East conflict, Ancram says, both Israel and the Palestinians must be prepared to make painful compromises, just as Britain and Ireland ultimately did. Ireland revoked an article in its Constitution that stipulated unifying both parts of Ireland. The IRA, which had vowed never to lay down its arms until this unification was achieved, declared a cease-fire and began to gradually disarm. The British ended its direct rule over the area, delegating authorities to the local government in Belfast and agreeing to bring Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, into government. They also significantly reduced their troops deployed in Northern Ireland and made changes in the local police force that were intended to>underplay Northern Ireland's connection to British sovereignty.

Ancram said: "The changes in the Irish Constitution were an important psychological step in creating confidence in the other side. Similarly, Catholics began to overcome their fear. They felt that even though they did not get all they wanted - a united Ireland - still, they did get parity ofesteem and full participation in the democratic process." This change was felt, first and foremost, in the economic sphere. Unemployment among Catholics plummeted from 23 percent in 1991 to 9 percent in 1999, among Protestants it fell from 11 percent to 5 percent.

A similar process could occur among the Palestinians, but first they need to give up their unrealistic dreams, he says. "There has to be some degree of compromise, as we know, on the Palestinian side. No way a settlement can be reached with an unqualified right of return for the Palestinians, because demographically that is or could be in time the end of the Jewish state of Israel."

On the other hand, he adds, "Israel should make some accommodation with regards to the Jewish settlements. Ultimately, the Middle East settlement will be based on two states, but it isn't just Jordan and Egypt agreeing to support such settlement - it has to be acknowledged by all those countries that threaten the security of Israel within the area. They've got equally to say `We accept the State of Israel.'"

But in the meantime, the Palestinians are overwhelmingly in favor of the continuation of the armed struggle against Israel, a position which is also held by the Palestinian leadership? "I think, undoubtedly, over many years, there has been propaganda within the Palestinian population, which has created a culture, created a mind-set, which is a mind-set at the moment which doesn't encompass a democratic solution. It has also been further strengthened by neighbors such as Syria and Iraq. But this attitude can be changed, as indeed happened with the Catholic population in Northern Ireland. But, there's no point talking to people who cannot deliver. I think it is very difficult to know whether Arafat could ever do a deal. The person who can do the final deal has to be someone who can deliver."

There must be some creativity, Ancram says. For example, an Israeli-Palestinian accord could be defined as in interim agreement without a definite time frame, instead of a final accord that puts an end to the conflict. Again, he refers to the Northern Ireland example: "People in theRepublican side in Northern Ireland, or in Ireland, said there is no compromise on the principle of one Ireland. The sanctity and integrity of the island and land of Ireland was not up for negotiation. So the way they managed to get around this was to say that the Good Friday agreement was an interim agreement. The Republicans were prepared to accept that there was a separate region of Northern Ireland and becoming part of the democratic process within it, because they were persuaded that it was an interim agreement. But how long is an interim agreement? Interim could be 200-300 years."

In the end, Ancram says, he is optimistic," because I believe that the indomitable spirit of man somehow breaks through all the hurdles that are placed on it by political systems and everything else. Somewhere there's human spirit which says we all want to be able to live with each other peacefully."

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©2002. All rights reserve. The Nonviolent Change Journal is published by the Research/Action Team on Nonviolent Large Systems Change - an interorganizational and international project of The Organization Development Institute.

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