Vol. XVII,
No.1 Fall, 2002
ARTICLES
Terrorist
or Freedom Fighter? The Impact of Trauma and Injustice
Lessons
From John Bull's Troubled Island
Rebuilding
A Damaged Palestine
Not
All Is Lost
Sri
Lanka Stops War To Talk Peace
REBUILDING A DAMAGED
PALESTINE
by Robert Malley
Reprinted from The
New York Times, May 7, 2002
(The New York Times website: http://www.nytimes.com/)
Distributed by Common Ground News Service with permission
to reprint
One of the significant subplots in the current Israeli-Palestinian
confrontation is that while Prime Minister Ariel Sharon loudly
denounces Yasir Arafat for seeking to draw the international
community into the conflict, Israel's actions push inexorably
toward that result. Secretary of State Colin Powell's announcement
that an international conference will be held this summer is
but the latest indication.
Beyond that, as the ability of
the Palestinian Authority to deliver basic social services or
ensure law and order declines, the prospects for more robust
international intervention increase. Ideas once considered far-fetched
a peacekeeping force, an international trusteeship or protectorate
over the Palestinian territories suddenly are being taken seriously.
The question is no longer whether the conflict will be internationalized,
but how. The challenge is to intervene in a way that accelerates
rather than impedes the search for an enduring solution.
Although the long-term strategy
behind Israel's military actions may be unclear, their immediate
impact on the Palestinian population is anything but. The operations
have crippled Palestinian security organizations, sapped the
ability of ministries to provide essential services and divided
the territories into disconnected parts.
Security concerns can legitimately
explain some of the Israeli Army's actions. But in more than
one instance, that rationale would be difficult to sustain. Civilian
ministries and medical facilities have been damaged; equipment
and public documents with no discernible intelligence value,
like school records, have been destroyed. The logic behind these
actions appears to have less to do with furthering Israel's security
than with its political goals. The result is that someone will
have to reconstruct those institutions and deliver services.
From Day One, the Palestinian
Authority has had to rely to a large extent on foreign help.
Arguably, every single one of its branches from security to financial
services has been supported, sometimes heavily, by one or several
international actors. To take the most conspicuous example, the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East runs roughly half of the social services in
the West Bank and Gaza. But now, given the damage, international
involvement of a far different magnitude may be necessary to
help the Palestinian Authority provide shelter, restore water
and sewage systems, and deliver basic government functions like
security and law and order. All this explains why so many are
thinking so seriously about putting a transitional international
structure in place.
Of course it may seem odd to evoke
any international presence at this time, given Israel's refusal
to allow a United Nations fact-finding team in Jenin. The dispute
over the fact-finding plan shows the intensity of Israel's general
distrust of international interference, which it views as a reward
for Palestinian violence, and its particular distrust of the
United Nations, which it views as hopelessly anti-Israeli. But
in this situation, there are no appealing alternatives. Israel
would be ill-advised to take on administration of the territories,
and the Palestinian Authority cannot administer them on its own.
Moreover, Israel's objections might well subside if an international
presence helped enhance security for Israelis and if its representatives
came from countries agreeable to both sides.
The challenge is to create an
international role that reflects the goals and concerns of the
two parties. Lessons from the history of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and from conflict-resolution efforts elsewhere suggest
a few key principles. First, and most important, the political
end game must be clearly stated. To introduce an international
apparatus without initially defining the outcome and a time line
for reaching that outcome is to invite constant manipulation
by the warring sides. Worse, the international effort would risk
being perceived by the Palestinian people as a civilian counterpart
to Israel's military occupation and therefore a target of radical
militants.
In this instance the outlines
of a final settlement are by now familiar: a sovereign and nonmilitarized
Palestinian state whose borders would be based on 1967 lines,
with land swaps of equal size to accommodate demographic realities;
Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and
Arab neighborhoods as the capital of Palestine; a robust international
force to provide security and monitor implementation of the agreement;
and a solution to the refugee issue that does not threaten Israel's
demographic balance.
Second, the goal should be to
restore the Palestinian Authority's capacity to operate not to
replace self government, but to support it. What smacks of external
imposition of control is likely to be treated as such. Finally,
the opportunity should not be lost to lay the foundation for
a truly modern Palestinian state. In the past decade, Palestinian
governance has proved to be a sorry tale of graft, economic mismanagement
and human rights violations. A broad-based international involvement
can help introduce more accountability and the rule of law. It
can also help turn the Palestinian security forces from a multitude
of competing fiefdoms into a more streamlined, professional police
force.The 20 months of fighting since the start of the second
intifada may well have slowed down the process of Palestinian
nation-building. But Israel's recent military actions will almost
certainly accelerate the process of internationalization that
Israelis have so far resisted and Palestinians have so often
called for. If done right, the introduction of an international
presence can benefit both sides. It can help increase security
for Israelis and Palestinians, rebuild Palestinian self-government
and provide Israel with assurances regarding Palestinian performance.
Most important, it may begin to set in motion the process that
should lead to the emergence of a viable state of Palestine living
side by side with Israel.
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