Nonviolent Change Journal

This article has been commissioned by the Common Ground News Service in partnership with Al-Hayat newspaper as part of a series of views on "The Arab Peace Initiative," with permission to republish. Shafeeq Ghabra is President of the American University in Kuwait and a Professor of Political Science.

     Saudi Prince Abdallah‚s peace initiative endorsed at the Beirut Arab League summit in March 2002 raises a number of issues and questions that the Arab world must address: Can the Arab states enter a new age of economic, political, and social development without a just peace that puts an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and relieves the region of a state of war that offers only a desolate future? Can armed resistance be sustained until Israel withdraws from the occupied territories or should Palestinians and other Arabs fundamentally reevaluate the continued use of this method? Should Arab efforts concern only territories occupied by Israel in 1967 or also include the rest of historic Palestine on which Israel was established in 1948? What are the positions of the Islamic movements and the Arab street vis-à-vis peace within the framework of establishing a Palestinian state and a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands? Can the initiative for peace endorsed by the Arab League summit in Beirut provide the basis of a united Arab position?

     The Beirut summit endorsement made official the Arab political leadership's acceptance of the idea of a comprehensive peace and normalization upon the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and an Israeli withdrawal on the Syrian front.

     More important, however, is the fact that the initiative indicated a readiness on behalf of the Arabs to pay the price of peace, which includes acceptance of Israel as a state within the region and transcending past tragedies and present problems in the hope of a better future. This development in the Arab position must not be overlooked. Indeed, this historic shift should be taken quite seriously.

     The Arab initiative came at a time when the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had reached yet another deadlock and when Arabs appeared to lack the implementation mechanisms to actively support such an initiative despite their endorsement of it. The Arab states‚ political position had suffered greatly in the wake of September 11th and the emergence of policies that tilted toward an Arab retreat from international politics.

     Israel delivered a fatal blow when it used the pretext of a suicide bombing and the war on terror to launch a brutal invasion of the West Bank on the night the initiative was endorsed in Beirut. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon opposed the initiative, perhaps because he did not believe that it held out an opportunity for achieving peace, but more likely because he believed in the necessity of retaking control of Palestinian territory with an eye toward its future annexation. Sharon represents an Israeli generation that places its faith in championing vigilance and continued readiness for confrontation so that the prospect of peace does not result in the erosion of the Israeli fighting spirit.

     At the same time, an influential current in the Arab world that is apprehensive about peace, even within the framework of the establishment of a Palestinian state, contributed to the initiative‚s demise. This trend believes that normalization of relations with Israel will serve to weaken the Arab and Islamic "cultural identities" and will result in the control of the region by the Israeli economy. The Islamic and nationalist political schools of thought believe that peace will transform Israel into a new Japan, which will invade Arab markets and subsume their culture.

     Bloody confrontations and the suffering of the Palestinian people as a result of Israel‚s occupation practices have led to a crisis of mutual apprehension between Judaism and Islam. History and losses on all sides make tender the painful memories in this troubled relationship, which virtually condemns every peace initiative to failure. Thus the two parties cannot see over the horizon to the potential benefits for all peoples of the region or imagine a peace that transcends historical, ideological, and religious obstacles. The war on Iraq and the war on terrorism have contributed to the disintegration of a viable Arab approach to peace and made more difficult the potential for reactivating mechanisms in support of Prince Abdallah‚s initiative.

     Creating a dialogue around the initiative and the necessities of peace, regardless of how far apart the parties may be, is essential for the region‚s extraction from the current quagmire and breaking the surreal suicide pact between Arabs and Israelis. Without setting forth a clear Arab strategy that identifies what is required from the Arab side (before identifying what is required from the Israeli or U.S. side), the creation of a viable and unified Arab position would prove susceptible to a great deal of manipulation. The sensitivity of the situation on the ground requires that Arabs make every effort to work together to revive Prince Abdallah's initiative and take stock of what is needed in order to do so.

     First, Arab leaders must initiate a candid dialogue with the Arab citizenry and political movements over the future. The Arab street experiences constant sorrow and pain as it watches continuing scenes of horrific Palestinian suffering, displacement, and dispossession and the low-grade genocide through the daily killing of innocent civilians. It is this street that is fodder for the slogans and visions of the Islamist and radical nationalist currents, who thrive on pointing to the dangers posed by Israel and the acceptance of peace with it, even if it withdraws from the occupied territories. This situation has led to the deep-seated apprehensions that contribute to the strain in Muslim and Jewish relations.

     Second, getting Arabs to face up to the burdens of peace is not possible without an Israeli initiative for peace accompanied by enhanced rhetoric on the matter and a different face to Israeli policies. An Israel controlled by the right wing of the political spectrum does not encourage Arabs to alter their thinking; rather it compels them to adhere to the failed positions of rejection and confrontation. In the same vein, the Israeli peace camp‚s loss of momentum since the Intifada will also not encourage change in the Arab world. Consequently, a state of war persists without a brake on the horizon to halt it or reduce its destructive power. Extremism grows in all directions, as the moderate currents fade in Israeli and Palestinian societies and in the Arab world in general, paving the way toward seemingly endless suffering.

     Third, an Arab and Palestinian policy is needed that in some way assists the Israeli currents of peace and moderation, regardless of how small or secluded they seem at the moment. The Arab side needs to enter into a serious dialogue with these Israeli forces in order to stanch the policies of domination practiced by the Israeli Right, which, if allowed to persist, will inflict insurmountable destruction on the region. For the Arabs, addressing Israeli
Fourth, the Arab-Israeli conflict requires the assistance of parties from outside the region--American, European, or otherwise--who genuinely recognize the necessity of resolving the conflict and are committed and armed with the courage to work toward that goal. The continuation of this conflict is pushing the Arab world and Israel toward a slow mutual suicide prefaced by horrific suffering.

     The current situation requires greater responsibility and courage from the Arabs. This includes waging a well-thought-out peace supported by official and non-official Arab institutions and leaders. This effort may contribute to the revival of an international interest in the potential for peace in a region that is craving for it.

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