|
Home
Subscribe
About The Journal
Current Issue
Editor's
Comments
Upcoming
Events
Ongoing
Activities
World
Developments
Dialoguing
What
We Are About
Articles
Media
Notes
Reports/Announcements
Funding
Past Issues
Editorial Team
Questions / Feedback
Selected Links
Articles
"Take the Peace Process
Public"
"Eighteen More Months
At Least"
"Israel's Options"
"The New Game Is No
Game"
"Peace-Making Ideas
That Are Intriguing, Controversial, But Worth Examining"
"Belfast Says: OE Jobs
Make Friends"
"The Year That the
Taboos Fell"
|
Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Winter, 2004
Articles
ISRAEL'S
OPTIONS
Hassan A. Barari
Source: The Jordan Times,
December 10, 2003, www.jordantimes.com. Distributed by the Common
Ground News Service, with permission for republication
Amid what appears to be a new wave of
political initiatives in the Middle East, chief among them the daring
Geneva accord signed last week, Israeli intellectuals and academics
have been hectically formulating competing policy options to handle the
Palestinian problem. Five alternatives can be discerned within the
Israeli discourse.
The first option is a long-term interim
agreement. The proponents of this deal make the case that the
Palestinians are not prepared for a final and comprehensive solution.
Thus, both sides would be better off if they agree on reconstructing
the roadmap plan and have it implemented gradually, over a period of 15
years. Gradualism contributed, by and large, to the failure of the Oslo
process. The problem with such approach is that it allows the enemies
of peace on both sides to foil any chance of progress. Moreover, given
the long period of implementation, there is no reason to assume that
the leadership on either side will remain committed to this scheme.
Those who are affiliated with the settlement
movement suggest a more extremist option of maintaining the status quo.
They are motivated by the anachronistic ideology that deems Greater
Israel as a practical option. By perpetuating the status quo, Israel
would realize its territorial goals. Explicit in their argument is that
peace will work against Israel's interests.
A third option is a comprehensive agreement
with the Palestinians, molded around the Geneva accord. Proponents of
this alternative believe that perpetuating the occupation or, worse,
the preemption of a two-state solution is incompatible with the
aspiration of the Zionist dream of having a Jewish democratic state.
They do not concur with Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon's mantra that
there are no Palestinians with whom to talk. The Geneva document
exposed the fallacy of this argument.
A fourth option is to bring about an
international intervention. Such an intervention would be only as an
Israeli tool to implement a two-state solution. It is different from
Martin Indyk's suggestion, a few months ago, of trusteeship.
The last option that is being discussed widely
is unilateral withdrawal. The working assumption is that there is no
Palestinian partner with whom to talk. Advocates of this option argue
that the problem is not only with the Palestinian leadership but also
with the Palestinians at large. They are unfazed by the Geneva document
that proves beyond doubt that Palestinians are both capable and willing
to make peace a strategic option. They also back the controversial
fence, albeit they disagree with its path. They do not, however,
suggest the Green Line to be the border of unilateral withdrawal.
The aforementioned options are informal and
none of them will be adopted by the Israeli government, which has
proved, time and again, its incapacity to handle the plethora of peace
initiatives. Regardless of the motivation behind the supporters of each
option, one fact remains clear: Israel is not living in a void. Any
alternative that does not take the regional dynamics into account will
certainly backfire. Israelis should understand that they need to live
in the region with other countries and not in spite of them. The only
option that will be accepted by regional players is one that is based
on a two-state solution.
Other options are really not options, but
fantasies. This is the first time that Palestinians and Israelis have
succeeded in signing a document, albeit an informal one, that addresses
the most complicated and knotty issues. A sane Israeli leadership would
waste no time and would build on this groundbreaking development.
Failing to do so will only complicate, rather than solve, the problem.
Hassan A. Barari is a
researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of
Jordan and the author of Israeli Politics and the Middle East Process,
1988-2002.
Top of Page
©2002,
2003, 2004. All rights
reserve. The Nonviolent Change Journal
is published by the Research/Action Team on Nonviolent Large Systems
Change - an interorganizational and international
project of The Organization Development Institute. Opinions
expressed are solely that of the writers and do not necessarily reflect
the opinions of the editing staff, Nonviolent
Change Journal,
Organization Development Institute, nor of the host and website owner
of CirclePoint
Permissions: Reposting and reprints are encouraged, as long as
proper source acknowledgement is given. As a courtesy, please let us
know that you are reprinting or electronically reposting. It helps
us know of the interest level. Thank you.
|